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Impacto de una pensio´n mı´nima en la poblacio´n de tercera edad34
y sus costos presupuestales. Evidencia para Latinoame´rica35
Resumen36
Este artı´culo examina el impacto sobre la pobreza y el costo fiscal de una pensio´n mı´nima uni-37
versal para la poblacio´n anciana en Latinoamerica usando datos de encuesta de hogares en 1838
paı´ses. La asistencia a la pobreza de la poblacio´n anciana necesita de una aproximacio´n diferente39
a la de otros grupos de edad y la pensio´n mı´nima puede ser una opcio´n alternativa viable. En40
primer lugar se mide la tasa de pobreza en la poblacio´n de ancianos. En segundo lugar se discute41
el disen˜o de un esquema de pensio´n mı´nima, con y sin eligibilidad de la asistencia, asi como el42
efecto desincentivo que se espera sobre el comportamiento social y econo´mico de las familias,43
incluyendo la oferta laboral ahorros y solidaridad familiar. Tercero, se utilizan las encuestas de44
hogares para simular el costo fiscal y el impacto sobre las tasas de probreza de un esquema de45
pensio´n mı´nima en los 18 paı´ses. El artı´culo muestra que una pensio´n mı´nima universal reducirı´a46
ampliamente la pobreza en la poblacio´n anciana, excepto en Argentina, Brazil, Chile y Uruguay,47
en donde la pensio´n mı´nima ya existe y las tasas de pobreza son bajas. Este tipo de esquemas48
generan varios comentarios en relacio´n con los incentivos, los efectos de dispersio´n y simplicidad49
adminsitrativa, pero tienen altos costos fiscales. Los costos fiscales son funcio´n de la edad en la50
cual los beneficios son asignados, la alta longevidad, la generosidad de los beneficios, la eficacia51
del mecanismo de eligibilidad y la capacidad fiscal del paı´s.52
53
Clasificacio´n JEL: D190, D310, H300, I380, 0150.54
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1 Introduction58
Alleviating old-age poverty requires different approach from other age groups.59
Since policies that go through labor and output markets and educational and60
training programs are ineffective, the only available instrument to alleviate61
old age poverty is a transfer of real income (possibly through price subsidies).62
In most developed countries, pension systems-which generally consist of a63
balanced combination of pay-as-you-go and funded schemes-include mini-64
mum pension schemes and are strongly redistributive, yielding a sizeable dif-65
ference between poverty rates before and after transfer.1 By contrast, in devel-66
oping countries with pension systems, one observes that they have a limited67
potential to solve old-age poverty because of the low coverage of those sys-68
tems. Coverage rates are below 30% in half Latin American countries. They69
range from around 10% of the labor force in Peru and Bolivia to about 60% in70
Chile. These figures are for 2006 and are based on the number of contributors71
(Mesa-Lago, 2004a; Rofman et al., 2008). As to the coverage of the elderly, the72
rates are extremely low in most Latin American countries. They range from73
5% in Honduras to 85% in Uruguay. They are about 60% higher than 60% in74
the traditional four, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay (ABCU, hereafter)75
plus Costa Rica and Bolivia.76
More efficient solution consists of lump-sum transfers financed by tax re-77
ceipts. These are pensions aimed at providing a replacement income to old78
persons under the poverty line and are of two types (Willmore, 2001; Holz-79
mann et al., 2009).2 The first type of minimum pension covers unconditionally80
all the elderly. Benefits are the same for everyone regardless of income, assets81
or work history. This distinguishes it from means-tested pensions which do82
not provide benefits (or provides reduced benefits) to those who have other83
income or assets, and from the minimum pension guarantee for which bene-84
ficiaries must have a history of contributions. In the OECD, only one country85
(New Zealand) provides a universal pension to its aged population with the86
objective to lift old persons above the poverty line. In low and middle in-87
come countries, only four countries have such universal minimum pension88
1Public old age pension systems are generally considered to have two objectives: income
replacement and poverty prevention. Contributory schemes (also called earnings-related or
insurance-based schemes) are used for the first objective. To fulfill the second objective, one relies
on noncontributory schemes providing minimum rate benefits (also called social pension). Both
separation and combination of these objectives have merits. By separating the two functions, one
hopes that the only distortions will arise from the redistributive pillar and that the contributory
pillar will carry no deadweight loss. By combining them, it is hoped that workers will perceive
the contributions they have to pay as an insurance premium and not as a tax. How payroll taxes
are perceived is an open and unresolved question (See on this point, Gill et al., 2005). Another ad-
vantage of merging the two functions is to make the whole system more politically sustainable.
This view prevails in Continental European countries which follow the Bismarckian tradition
(Casamatta et al., 2000). Empirically and theoretically, there appears to be a positive relationship
between the generosity of a pension system and its contributory nature.
2It should be noted that reduced contributory pensions are also called “minimum pension
schemes”. These are aimed at workers who have had some work career but could not accumulate
enough pension rights to reach a certain minimum level. These workers are entitled to a min-
imum pension that is not subject to any condition, except age condition and sometimes family
structure.
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arrangements: Mauritius, Namibia, Botswana and Bolivia (On Mauritius, see89
Willmore, 2003). They are easy to administer and do not require information90
on the income of assets of the beneficiaries. They offer a pension which is rel-91
atively low and, with the exception of Mauritius, not high enough to lift its92
beneficiaries above the poverty line.93
The second type ofminimumpension is also universal but subject tomeans-94
testing. This welfare pension can be completed by housing subsidy or the95
possibility of being admitted in a public nursing home.3 A number of de-96
veloping countries have universal means-tested schemes although the means97
test applies to the household and not to the individual. The most famous98
examples are rural Brazil and South Africa. The South African minimum pen-99
sion is quite generous in terms of level (about one-third of per capita income)100
and the number of beneficiaries is high reaching 88% of the covered popu-101
lation. The pension is paid to men aged 65 and women aged 60 and over.102
It is funded through general taxation. The Brazilian minimum pension, for103
which the eligibility age is 60 for men and 55 for women, corresponds to the104
minimum wage (Beltra˜o et al., 2004). It is also worth mentioning Mexico City105
(Federal District) and its program of transfers for food expenses to the elderly106
living in poor areas. A few studies examine the incidence of minimum pen-107
sion schemes. Barrientos et al. (2003) studies the effect of social pensions on108
the poverty rate of elderly people in rural Brazil and South Africa and com-109
putes poverty rates and poverty gaps with and without means-tested mini-110
mum pension. He shows that, in both countries, the non-contributory pen-111
sion reduces both the rate of poverty and the poverty gap. Rivera-Marques112
et al. (2004) study the incidence of Mexico City’s safety net for the elderly113
and show that the program reduces poverty and inequality but that its perfor-114
mance in terms of poverty reduction is weaker as soon as the eligibility rules115
are relaxed (no means test and extension to non-poor areas). Other recent116
analysis of universal means-tested pension schemes (which are discussed be-117
low) include Carvalho and Evangelista (2001), Bertrand et al. (2003) and Duflo118
(2003).119
In Latin America, five countries-Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and120
Uruguay-have non-contributory pensions (Bertranou et al., 2004). These pro-121
grams generally have a social assistance character. In that they are targeted122
at the poor and disabled who have no contributory capacity. In Brazil and123
Costa Rica, part of the social assistance pension benefits is financed by cross-124
subsidies from social insurance programs. In terms of coverage, Chile, Uru-125
guay and Costa Rica offer the greatest coverage but, in absolute terms, Brazil126
has a social assistance program with more than 2 million beneficiaries and, if127
the rural pensions program is included, the number of beneficiaries exceeds128
8 million. Table 1 gives the main features of Latin American pension policies.129
For more details, see, e.g., Holzmann et al. (2009) and Mesa-Lago (2004a).130
Even with high rate of coverage poverty will only be eradicated if benefits are131
high enough and the family structure is not too burdensome.132
3There is also an age condition and, in some cases, conditions of citizenship or legal residency.
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Argentina mixed 24 1994 75
Bolivia private 11 1997 90
Brazil public - - 85
Chile private 58 1981 80
Colombia pub/priv 24 1994 25
Costa Rica mixed 48 2001 60
Dominican
Republic
private - 2003 10
Ecuador mixed 21 2004 31
Salvador private 19 1998 15
Guatemala public - - 15
Honduras public - - 5
Mexico private 30 1997 20
Nicaragua private 16 2004 -
Panama public - - 40
Paraguay public - - 15
Peru pub/priv 11 1993 25
Uruguay mixed 60 1996 85
Venezuela public - - 30
Source: Mesa-Lago (2004b) and Rofman et al. (2008) for last column.
2 Evidence on poverty in old age133
At the international level, surprisingly little evidence is available on poverty134
in old age. For example, in its statistical publications, the World Bank does135
not report poverty rates for all age groups (World Bank, 2005). Data on child136
poverty are published separately but not data on poverty in old age. Only137
recently have there been efforts to publish internationally comparable indica-138
tors of welfare from an age-specific perspective for rich and poor countries139
(see for example HelpAge International (2004) and Kakwani et al. (2004)).140
In developed countries, the old age poverty rates are generally not much141
lower than those for the total population but this is a relatively recent trend.142
A few decades ago, the average income of the elderly was substantially lower143
than that of other age groups and their rate of poverty much higher (Fo¨rster144
et al., 2003). In developing countries, patterns are different and there is no145
obvious trend. As far as Latin America is concerned, the poverty headcount146
for the elderly is clearly lower than for the population average in the cases of147
ABCU and to a lesser extent in Nicaragua and Panama. It is higher in the other148
countries as shown in figures 1 and 2 below.4 These four countries, Argentina,149
4In this and the following figures, households are defined as follows: NEHH is a household
with no elderly members. EHH is a household with at least one elderly member. EHH house-
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Figure 1. Poverty headcount ratio by country
Note: Poverty line = 50% of median per capita income. Household incomes were equiv-
alized using the OECD equivalency scale adjusted household size [= 1+(# of adults  
1)  0:5 + # of children  0:3]. An adult was a household member aged 18 years or
more, a child was a houshold member aged less than 18 years at the time of the survey,
elderly are households member aged 60 years or more.
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, which are among the richest in our sample, will150
often behave differently from the rest.151
Poverty in old age can still be observed even in countries –for instance152
in the OECD– that have generous transfers for the elderly including targeted153
minimum pensions. This seems puzzling at first sight since the pension is154
universal and its level is above the poverty line (generally half the median155
income). There are at least three reasons for this apparent puzzle: family com-156
position (if the other familymembers do not have any resource. the equivalent157
income of each member can be below the poverty line); take-up issue (when158
the pension is means-tested some individuals can be reluctant to claim it) and159
finally, given that it is subject to a means-test, some elderly people prefer to160
keep their assets even if these assets don’t generate much income.161
2.1 Old age poverty rates under current policies162
Figure 1 presents the poverty ratio for the persons older than 60 and for the163
whole population in Latin America. The poverty ratio is based on a poverty164
holds are divided into two subsets, namely EHH1 (elderly living alone by themselves) and EHH2
(consisting of both elderly and non-elderly members).
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Figure 2. Poverty headcount ratio by country
Note: Poverty line = $ 2 a day. Household incomes were equivalized using the
OECD equivalency scale adjusted household size [= 1 + (# of adults   1)  0:5 +
# of children  0:3]. An adult was a household member aged 18 years or more, a child
was a houshold member aged less than 18 years at the time of the survey, elderly are
households member aged 60 years or more.
line equal to half the median income of the household. Figure 2 present the165
poverty ratio using a different definition of the poverty line, namely a poverty166
line equal to $2 a day. The equivalence scale we use is the OECD scale that is167
equal to 0:5 + 0:5  number of adults +0:3 number of children (up to age168
16).5169
With the poverty rate calculated with the OECD scale and a poverty line170
equal to half the median income, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina (and to a171
lesser extent Nicaragua) have low poverty rates comparable to most OECD172
countries (below 11%).6 These four countries are often associated as having173
the same “mature” treatment of old age. It is worth noting that they do not all174
belong to the richest Latin American countries as one can see on table 5 in the175
5In the appendix we present poverty rates for the population aged 65+ instead of 60+ and
for per capita income instead of equivalized income.
6These figures for Latin America can be compared with those for Africa where the percent-
age of households with elderly living alone is small. Elderly with children also represent a small
percentage (about 1% in Uganda, Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi). However, house-
holds headed by the elderly are more frequent, ranging between 12 to 27 percent. The incidence
of poverty among elderly persons is generally higher than on average, and higher than among
the non-elderly in 11 of the 15 countries for which data are available. The exceptions are Burundi,
Madagascar, Mozambique and Uganda (Kakwani et al., 2004).
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appendix. Mexico and Venezuela are richer than Brazil and Argentina. For the176
other 14 countries the poverty rates are quite higher and in most cases higher177
than for the rest of the population. With the US$2 a day poverty threshold the178
poverty rates in ABCU become negligible (< 3%), still lower in old age than179
in the whole population. In Nicaragua as well the poverty rate of the elderly180
is lower than that of the rest of the population, but both are high.181
We draw three main conclusions from the comparison of old age poverty182
in these Latin American countries. First, poverty rates are consistently lower183
for the elderly than for the whole population in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil184
and Chile.7 Second, in the other countries, the situation is heterogeneous and185
depends on the poverty line chosen. Using half the median income, Bolivia,186
Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras and Mexico have comparable overall levels187
of poverty in old age and the elderly are poorer than the rest of the population.188
Finally, the difference between old age and overall poverty rates is not very189
high for all countries with limited pension systems.190
Old age poverty is computed here using household surveys. As pointed191
out by Angus (1997), when household per capita income (or expenditure) is192
used as the main welfare indicator, the assumption made about the way in193
which resources are shared in the family to which an elderly belongs affects194
the quality of the estimates. The assumptions made by statistical agencies can195
by themselves bias estimates against old age poverty. As an example Deaton196
and Paxson (1998, p. 243) mention that the “fact” that there is less poverty197
among the elderly in the United States depends on the assumption in the offi-198
cial counts that the elderly need less than adults younger than 60.199
Twomajor issues complicate the problem of measuring poverty in old age.200
First, the elderly may often be living in households that are not that poor even201
though they themselves are not receiving any pension so that the often used202
implicit assumption of fair sharing might be invalid.8 Second, the measure-203
ment of poverty in old age needs to be sensitive to the potential impact of204
economies of scale in household consumption on the perceived well-being of205
the aged. Typically households with many children are deemed to be among206
the poorest if one does not adjust for economies of scale. Then pensioner207
households or households headed by widows, etc are not very highly repre-208
sented among the poor.9 To illustrate the importance of equivalence scales,209
7Interestingly, this is not the case in Costa Rica which has a non-contributory pension scheme
but with the least generous average benefit of the 5 Latin countries with social assistance pensions
(Bertranou et al., 2004).
8Traditionally equal sharing is assumed, with possibly a downward adjustment for children.
Yet there is ample evidence to suggest that this is not the case. In the real world, we observe a
wide range of situations ranging from the idyllic image of a family all devoted to the care of its
elderly members to the more depressing representation of elderly being kept in the closet. The
later situation has recently received a lot of attention in India where widows who represent a
large fraction of the elderly (55% of women aged 60 and above are widowed-see Jensen (2003))
and often do not receive an equal share within the household (Dreze and Srinivasan, 1997). There
is also the case of the Tanzanian “witches” studied by Miguel (2005) who shows how harshly
unproductive members of a family can be treated by the others.
9Economies of scale resulting from living together and sharing goods such as housing,
means of transportation, etc vary across countries, years and income levels. The extent of scale
economies depend on the allocation between private and public goods in the household’s con-
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consider a society in which the elderly on average belong to family units of210
size 2 whereas the size of households without elderly is 5. Their aggregate211
income is respectively 5 and 10. Without scale economies, the elderly income212
is 2.5 and that of individuals living in households without elderly is 2. Us-213
ing a standard equivalence scale (i.e., the square root of family size), these214
figures become 3.5 and 4.4. In other words, thanks to the economies of scale,215
the welfare of the non-elderly families can be higher than that of families with216
elderly.217
In that respect it is interesting to analyze the structure of our elderly house-218
holds. As it appears in table 6 in the appendix, Uruguay is the country where219
there are the largest fraction (0.54) of elderly households in which elderly indi-220
viduals live on their own. In most OECD countries this fraction is even higher.221
At the other extreme we have Nicaragua with only 10% of elderly households222
consisting of only elderly individuals. In many countries children (16-) live in223
elderly households. In figure 3 we distinguish elderly households with and224
without non-elderly for poverty based on half the median income. These two225
subsets are denoted EHH2 and EHH1 respectively. It appears that poverty226
is relatively higher in the first group in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and in El227
Salvador. In all the other countries poverty is higher in households made of228
only elderly individuals.229
In a number of cases the differences are huge showing the (assumed) role230
of family solidarity and the importance of the selected equivalence scale. To231
explore this point, as a thought experiment, we have posited that al the el-232
derly individuals would live on their own. More precisely, we have assumed233
that the elderly living with younger family members would split and live sep-234
arately on their own resources. The outcome of such a split is given in figures235
4 and 5. Here again we see that Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay behave differ-236
ently from the rest. In these countries poverty is lower for elderly living on237
their own than for younger individuals.238
In this exercise we have used the pivotal age of 60 to define old age. The239
definition of what constitutes ”old age” needs to be defined in relationship240
to longevity. Mortality has been rapidly declining over the last 50 years but241
there are great variations across countries and over time. All things being242
equal, average income and poverty levels for individuals above 60 are clearly243
sumption basket, an allocation which is endogenous depending on prices and income. House-
hold size, age and gender of household members may also influence the amount of resources
needed to attain a certain level of well-being. The consumption needs of children are usually
thought as being quite lower than that of adults. To go from household’s resources to individual
well-being, the concept of equivalent household scale is used. For example, the OECD currently
uses an equivalence scale equal to 0:5+ 0:5 (number of adults)+0:3 (number of children). A
household consisting of two adults and three children would need to spend 2.4 times as much as
a single adult to be equally as well off as a single adult. By contrast, in the absence of economies
of scale and with the same needs for both children and adults, this family would need 5 time as
much as a single adult to reach the same welfare. An alternative equivalence scale formula is
simply to take the square root of the family size (which, in our example, would give an equiv-
alent size of 2.2, i.e., close to that of the OECD). Lanjouw et al. (2004) examine the incidence of
scale economies on the poverty rate of the elderly in selected transition economies. They show
that, without scale economies, poverty in old age is relatively low but that it increases with scale
economies and rapidly become more important than in younger age groups.
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Figure 3. Poverty headcount ratio by country
Note: Poverty line = 50% of median per capita income. OECD equivalency scale ad-
justed houshold size poverty headcount ratios for the population and its subgroups
estimated using the same poverty line. Elderly are households members aged 60 years
or more.
different if life expectancy is 78, as in developed countries, or 46 as in African244
countries. If the same cut-off age is chosen for all countries (say 60 or 65), there245
is a serious selection bias in the group of people above 60 for countries where246
longevity is 46. However the comparison between rich and poor countries247
may be seriously flawed because the main reason why life expectancy at birth248
is low in poor countries is child mortality.249
Another difficulty comes from the relation between the pivotal age and the250
retirement age (i.e., the mandatory age at which workers have to stopworking251
and/or the age at which retirees start benefiting from a pension). The rate of252
labor participation, formal or informal, above 60 varies significantly across253
countries and this depends in larger part on existing social security schemes.254
This is the reason why the appendix reports results for the alternative cut-off255
age of 65. Table 7 compares the poverty rates for elderly 60+ versus elderly256
65+. In most countries poverty is slightly higher with 65+ except in ABCU,257
Bolivia, Ecuador and Panama.258
2.2 Poverty Rates without Transfers259
Table 2 compares poverty rates (headcount ratios based on a 0.5 median in-260
come poverty line) in those 18 Latin American countries for the elderly. The261
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Figure 4. Poverty headcount ratio by country. Artificially split households
Note: Poverty line = 50% of median per capita income. OECD equivalency scale ad-
justed household size. The poverty line is the same as that in the original population
without the artificial splits.
first columns show the poverty rates under the actual situation and the second262
set of columns the poverty rates without transfers. Computations are shown263
for both the elderly and the whole population.264
One observes that the incidence of social transfers is clear particularly265
when the post transfer poverty rate is low: Argentina’s poverty rate falls from266
around 55 to 13 percent. Brazil’s rate falls from 52 to 6% and Uruguay’s rate267
from 51 to 8%. In general, however, the reduction in poverty rates is less im-268
portant than in OECD countries for an obvious reason: with rare exceptions269
there are no pension systems in Latin American particularly aimed at reduc-270
ing poverty among old people.271
2.3 Simulating the impact of minimum pensions272
This section presents the results of a micro-simulation exercise consisting in273
introducing a minimum pension in 18 Latin American countries, we follow274
Atkinson et al. (2002). We are concerned by two questions: how much mini-275
mum pension schemes would cost and howmuch poverty would they permit276
eradicating in Latin American countries. Answer to both questions clearly de-277
pends on the particular design of the minimum pension that is selected. We278
present here 2 possible schemes given a target minimum income of z. Let279
y denote the non public pension income of elderly and p their current public280
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Figure 5. Poverty headcount ratio by country. Elderly living alone vs. elderly
in artificially split houses
Note: Poverty line = 50% of median per capita income. OECD equivalency scale ad-
justed household size. The poverty line is the same as that in the original population
without the artificial splits.
pensions plus social transfers. In other words private pensions, if any, are part281
of y. Furthermore, we take z as equal to the poverty line.282
1) Unconditional topping-up: Elderly transfer guaranteeing poverty line in-
come to all individuals aged x or more:
T = Max(0:z   p) ifAge > x
2) Conditional topping-up: Elderly means-tested transfer guaranteeing po-
verty line income
T = Max(0:z   p  y) ifAge > x
The first scheme thus implies a uniformminimum pension and the second283
a variable one, which depends on households’ resources. We briefly discuss284
the importance of the key parameters of these formulas.285
Age. For contributory pensions, the eligibility age is part of the financial286
constraint conceived individually or collectively. But in the case of noncon-287
tributory pensions there is some arbitrariness to determine at what age a per-288
son without any resource and any employment history suddenly is entitled to289
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Table 2. Poverty headcount ratios in the absence of current pension transfers











Argentina 0.21 0.33 0.13 0.55
Bolivia 0.23 0.31 0.29 0.52
Brazil 0.22 0.33 0.06 0.52
Chile 0.16 0.23 0.15 0.39
Colombia 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.47
Costa Rica 0.18 0.22 0.32 0.48
DR 0.18 0.27 0.22 0.41
Ecuador 0.19 0.25 0.25 0.39
El Salvador 0.17 0.29 0.17 0.43
Guatemala 0.22 0.3 0.24 0.35
Honduras 0.28 0.39 0.31 0.52
Mexico 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.43
Nicaragua 0.2 0.25 0.17 0.29
Panama 0.23 0.34 0.23 0.51
Paraguay 0.23 0.3 0.23 0.41
Peru 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.3
Uruguay 0.17 0.33 0.08 0.51
Venezuela 0.18 0.24 0.21 0.38
Note: OECD adjusted HH sizes are used in calculating the poverty head-
count ratios. The poverty line is half of the national median per capita
income.
a transfer. The eligibility age should be determined by the capacity of the pen-290
sioner to work or not. It should thus be a function of health and of longevity.291
Given the level of benefits, the length of the entitlement-i.e., the difference292
between life expectancy and the age chosen-is what matters for the revenue293
constraint. Traditionally the retirement age tends to be lower for women than294
for men even though lately one witnesses harmonization (always towards the295
higher age) driven by gender equality and budget constraint considerations.296
We report simulation results for two definitions of “old age”: 60 and older and297
65 and older (in the appendix).298
Means Test. Since the objective is to reduce poverty in old age, the only299
meaningful choice is between an unconditional minimum pension and a con-300
ditional (i.e., means-tested) pension. A minimum pension guarantee which301
covers only workers with some minimal career would exclude too many peo-302
ple. An unconditional pension has a number of advantages: it is adminis-303
tratively simpler; it implies less disincentives to work and save; and it carries304
less stigma. It is however costlier though there is the possibility of taxing those305
who do not really need it but this then creates some unwanted administrative306
costs: testing means or taxing those who don’t need the pension are formally307
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Figure 6. Poverty headcount ratio by country. After top-up transfer (with
change in poverty headcount ratio)
Note: Poverty line = 50% of median per capita income. OECD equivalency scale ad-
justed household size. The poverty line after top-up transfers were estimated using the
pre-transfer poverty line.
similar. Therefore, a priori, an unconditional pension would cost more than308
a conditional one but would be more attractive. The choice boils down to309
questions of financial feasibility and, above all, political support. If there are310
strong revenue constraints, it might be desirable to introduce other types of311
conditionality. For example, in Mexico, the uniform pension is offered in the312
Federal District to those known to be the poorest. In Brazil, the uniform pen-313
sion (which is means tested) is restricted to rural areas.314
Level of Benefits. It is reasonable to set the level of benefits as a function of315
an indicator of poverty such as the minimum wage or the poverty line. The316
benefit could be in cash or in nature. When there is a risk that the pension317
would not reach the elderly and when the pension is likely to be very small.318
it might be preferable to provide benefits such as food or health stamps than319
cash. Here we have decided to take the poverty threshold as a benefit target.320
Fiscal Cost. To approximate the cost of providing a minimum pension, we
use the revenue constraint
tEY = ET
where t is the contribution rate; Y the individual income; and T the level of321
minimum pension. We use the operator E as a short for the sum over all the322
individuals concerned. The feasibility of our minimum pension scheme will323
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Figure 7. Poverty headcount ratio. After top-up transfer (with change in
poverty headcount ratio)
Note: Poverty line = $2 a day. OECD equivalency scale adjusted household size.
clearly depend on the level of t, that is the fraction of mean income that is324
needed to finance it.325
3 Incentive effects of minimum pensions326
Minimum pensions are expected to have disincentive effects on individual de-327
cisions and on the economic and social behavior of households. These incen-328
tive effects will not be taken into account. To do so we would need behavioral329
microsimulations, which are out of the scope of this paper. Let us however330
mention the various behavioral reactions one can expect from minimum pen-331
sions schemes.332
Retirement Decision. In developed countries low rates of activity among333
elderly workers and low effective age of retirement threaten the financial via-334
bility of social security systems by generating, in conjunction with increasing335
longevity, high dependency ratios (Gruber and Wise, 1999). The availability336
of a minimum pension at an early age is a factor explaining early retirement.337
For developing countries, a low rate of labor participation in old age is less of338
an issue. The problem can be avoided by choosing an entitlement age that is339
not too low. Comparing means-tested and unconditional minimum pension340
schemes. the former one will induce retirement earlier than the latter to the341
extent that it includes an earnings test.342
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Prodigality Effect. In the presence of a minimum pension, some individ-343
uals who would otherwise have saved for retirement could be tempted to344
reach retirement without any resources trusting that they are entitled to some345
minimal protection. These individuals, labeled ”rational prodigals” in the lit-346
erature, have to be induced to save by making the minimum pension less347
attractive. However by doing so in a world of asymmetric information, one348
penalizes people who really depend on the minimum pension because they349
are unable to accumulate enough resources for retirement. The prodigality350
argument was introduced by Hayek (1960, p. 286) who advocated an old age351
pension whose raison d’eˆtre “is not that people should be coerced to do what352
is in their individual interest but that by neglecting to make provisions, they353
would become a charge to the public. Up to this point the justification for354
the whole apparatus of ‘social security’ can probably be accepted by the most355
consistent defenders of liberty”.10356
Mobility. The incidence of a minimum rate pension when workers are mo-357
bile is ambiguous. From the tax competition literature. we know that it will358
attract low income retirees from less generous neighboring countries. This359
will have the effect of pushing down these pensions and of resulting in what360
is often called a race to the bottom. At the same time, the insurance of obtain-361
ing a minimum pension regardless of one’s career can induce mobility within362
a country.363
Longevity. As already mentioned, dependency ratios are lower in develop-364
ing countries because longevity is lower. which limits the fiscal cost of a min-365
imum pension, but the trend in developing countries is toward an increase366
in dependency ratios as a result of increased longevity and declining fertility367
(Wolfensohn and Bourguignon, 2004, p. 26). The cost of minimum pension368
programs will thus increase. At the same time, minimum pensions would369
induce by themselves an increase in longevity since they would provide the370
elderly with better food and health care. Even in societies where transfers like371
these minimum pensions are “confiscated” by other members of the extended372
family, there are incentives to keep the beneficiaries alive and well as long as373
possible.374
Weakening Family Ties. In developing countries, elderly people often live375
within a rather extended family and, in the absence of pensions, they rely376
on younger generations to provide them food and care. These types of ar-377
rangements have been studied by sociologists, anthropologists and more re-378
cently by economists (Barrientos et al., 2003). The mechanisms underlying379
these family arrangements range from pure altruism to cooperative or strate-380
gic exchange, to social pressure. One hypothesis-known as the old age secu-381
rity hypothesis-linking social security with fertility and family solidarity goes382
as follows: in the absence of social security, parents depend on their children383
to give them care and attention in their old age and, thus, tend to have many384
children. As societies develop, social security institutions appear, and chil-385
10Along the same lines, it is worth pointing out that a minimum pension can affect financial
risk taking. In countries with individualized accounts and retirement money invested in the stock
market, middle and low income workers may have a strong incentive to choose a portfolio with
high risk and high return profiles as they can always be bailed out.
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dren are much less needed as sources of support in old age: fertility falls and386
family links distend.387
Since we are interested to find out what impact a minimum pension would388
have on poverty in old age, the relevant question is how the additional re-389
source represented by this transfer would be used by the elderly living in an390
extended household. The key issue is whether or not they will benefit, at least391
in part, from their pension. Some family structures in Africa and in Asia care392
for the elderly but restrict their needs to the minimum.11 In such situations a393
minimum pension would, de facto, be confiscated away from the elderly and394
miss its intended objective.395
Spillover Effects. In general one expects a more equitable allocation of re-396
sources within the extended family to result from transfers of this type with397
various consequences. The case of South Africa is interesting in this regard.398
Women turning 60 and men turning 65 become eligible for a pension roughly399
equal to twice the per capita income of black Africans in South Africa. This400
cash transfer had a double effect. First, it resulted in a drop in labor sup-401
ply of prime-age individuals living with these elderly, particularly when the402
pensioner is a woman (Bertrand, Mullainathan and Miller 2003). See also403
Jakubowicz (2004) for the case of rural Brazil. Second it resulted in improved404
health of the granddaughters when the grandmother is the beneficiary (Du-405
flo, 2003). These results show the type of ’arbitrage’ that can be observed in an406
extended family. The role played by women is also striking. These minimum407
pensions have positive spillovers for other members of the extended family.408
Carvalho and Evangelista (2001) has studied the effect on labor outcomes and409
school enrollment of children residing with the beneficiaries of the pensions410
awarded to rural workers in Brazil. They show that these old age benefits fos-411
ter school enrollment and decrease child labor participation; they also show412
that the intensity of these effects depends on the gender of the beneficiaries413
and of the children concerned.414
4 Simulation results for 18 latin american countries415
We now turn to the results of our “mechanical” (as opposed to behavioral)416
microsimulations using household survey data for 18 Latin America coun-417
tries for the latest available year. The surveys give us the disposable income418
(resources) and the family structure for aged people. We use two alternatives419
definitions of old age: 60 and 65 (the latter in the appendix). The disposable420
income is the sum of all the resources available in the family unit to which the421
elderly person(s) belong(s) divided by the equivalence scale. The simulation422
consists in introducing a minimum pension equal to the poverty rate. This423
pension is given to all elderly granted they do not receive any other transfers424
from the government. If they do, the new pension is adjusted accordingly. We425
consider two scheme depending on whether or not the minimum pension is426
means tested, the means being the resources of the elderly concerned.427
11See footnote 9, Dreze and Srinivasan (1997) and Miguel (2005).
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In the simulations, we use two specifications for the minimum pension428
US$2 a day or 50% of median income. We are interested in measuring the im-429
pact on the poverty rate and the fiscal cost of this minimum pension. Clearly430
since the minimum pension is aimed at reaching the poverty line, if all elderly431
would live by themselves, poverty in old age would disappear. Poverty will432
only remain because a majority of elderly live with younger family members433
with whom they share all the available resources. Consequently results will434
depend on the equivalence scale and on the structure of the family where the435
elderly people live.436
The results are presented in figures 8 and 9 for the two levels of poverty.437
These figures show the decrease in poverty rates due to the two types of438
schemes. Not surprisingly the decline in poverty is higher when there is no439
means test. In that case, some elderly end up with an income higher than440
the poverty line and this can be shared among all the members of the house-441
holds. Let us repeat that if all elderly were living on their own, poverty would442
disappear under the two schemes.443
5 The cost of the two schemes444
It might be useful to relate the cost of our minimum pension scheme to the445
concept of poverty gap, that is the amount relative to the poverty line that446
has to be transferred to the poor families to bring their incomes up to the447
poverty threshold. In other words the poverty gap give the relative amount448
of resources that one needs to eradicate poverty. If we measure the poverty449
gap for the population of elderly and if we assume that all the elderly live450
alone, the poverty gap and the cost of a minimum pension with means testing451
would coincide.12452
Figures 8 and 9 give the cost of the minimum pension expressed here as453
a fraction of personal income.13 The cost is high when the poverty line (and454
thus the minimum pension) is based on 50% of median income-which is also455
the minimum pension scheme that is the most efficient at lowering poverty.456
The highest cost is for Ecuador and Mexico. It is naturally higher when there457
is no means test. The cost depends on the share of old persons in the total458
population; on the average income of old households relative to the median;459
and on the presence or not of transfers (the minimum pension policy will be460
more expensive if there are no transfers to start with).461
12Table 7 in the appendix, presents the poverty gap index for the whole population and for the
population of elderly. The poverty gap index is the ratio of the difference between the poverty
level and the actual non pension income of the poor over the poverty line. The relative cost of
the means test scheme is the ratio of the difference between the poverty line and the actual non
pension income over the average income.
13To express the fiscal cost as a share of GDP the figures would need to be multiplied by a
factor of 0.5 to 0.7.
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Figure 8. Cost of minimum pension program by country
Note: Poverty line = 50% of median per capita income. Cost is expressed as top-up
pensions summed across HH’s as a percentage of incomes summed across all HH’s in
the country.
Figure 9. Cost of minimum pension program by country
Note: Poverty line = $2 a day. Cost is expressed as top-up pensions summed across
HH’s as a percentage of incomes summed across all HH’s in the country.
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6 Conclusions462
The keystone idea of this paper is that societies are rightfully judged on the463
way they treat their elderly and particularly their poor elderly and that the464
best way to alleviate poverty in old age is through a scheme of basic pensions.465
We applied this idea to a set of 18 Latin American countries. The main conclu-466
sionwe draw is that minimumpensions lead to a very substantial reduction in467
poverty and that in general their cost is reasonable. Not surprisingly both the468
effect and the cost of such a scheme drastically vary with the type of poverty469
threshold chosen. Relative to half the median income a US$2 a day pension470
costs less. This is particularly true in richer countries where a $2 a day pension471
seems negligible.472
Tables 3 and 4 summarize some of the key results. With half the median473
income the relative reduction ranges from 17% in Colombia to 75% in Costa474
Rica. The absolute reduction ranges from 2% in Brazil to 24% in Costa Rica.475
As to the relative cost, it ranges from 0.1% in Brazil to 2.9% in Columbia.476
Columbia is a particular case. The minimum pension there costs a lot and477
yet it has a very small effect, both relative (0.168) and absolute (0.05). This478
puzzling result is due to the family structure: we should remember that if all479
elderly would live on themselves poverty would disappear. Poverty remains480
because the minimum pension is diluted among non-elderly household mem-481
bers.482
With a $2 a day the absolute reduction in poverty ranges from a negligible483
amount in Chile and Uruguay to 11% in Columbia. The relative reduction484
ranges from 16% in Nicaragua to 80% in Argentina. Not surprisingly the cost485
is lower. It is negligible in Brazil, Chile and reaches a maximum of 1.5% in486
Columbia.487
Finally, let us address two key questions. Are those schemes financially488
affordable and politically sustainable? The affordability depends on which489
threshold we choose, $2 a day or half the median income, and on the level490
of national income. As a rule of thumb we would say that countries with491
national income above the Latin American average could and should opt for492
a minimum pension equal to half the median income. For the others, a $2493
a day pension is reasonable. It is interesting to consider the countries that494
are relatively richer than the other: ABCU, Mexico and Venezuela. It is clear495
that a minimum pension equal to half the median income seems to be more496
desirable in these latter two countries where the rate of poverty is higher and497
the reduction (12% in both countries) substantial.498
If we turn to the poorest countries, Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua and499
Paraguay, a $2 minimum pension will have clear effects but with a cost rang-500
ing from 1.1% to 0.3%, which seems affordable. It is worth noticing that Bo-501
livia that has a quasi universal pension scheme keeps a quite high poverty rate502
among elderly. This naturally comes from the fact that the existing scheme503
provides benefits that are quite below the poverty line based on $2 a day.504
The final question is that of political sustainability. Even if such pension505
scheme is adopted there is always the risk to see it progressively eroded be-506
cause of lack of political will. Elderly people particularly in developing coun-507
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Table 3. Summary of results: Poverty reduction among the elderly with
























Argentina 0.13 0.09 0.685 0.019 0.012
Bolivia 0.29 0.17 0.597 0.012 0.007
Brazil 0.06 0.01 0.198 0.001 0
Chile 0.15 0.05 0.369 0.006 0.005
Colombia 0.31 0.15 0.48 0.029 0.02
Costa Rica 0.32 0.24 0.738 0.021 0.016
DR 0.22 0.13 0.621 0.019 0.014
Ecuador 0.25 0.1 0.402 0.009 0.007
El Salvador 0.17 0.11 0.656 0.024 0.018
Guatemala 0.24 0.08 0.347 0.007 0.005
Honduras 0.31 0.16 0.508 0.017 0.013
Mexico 0.28 0.12 0.405 0.009 0.007
Nicaragua 0.17 0.02 0.133 0.005 0.003
Panama 0.23 0.15 0.643 0.018 0.013
Paraguay 0.23 0.14 0.591 0.019 0.014
Peru 0.23 0.15 0.633 0.022 0.016
Uruguay 0.08 0.05 0.709 0.017 0.011
Venezuela 0.21 0.12 0.581 0.023 0.016
Note: OECD adjusted HH sizes are used in calculating the poverty head-
count ratios.
tries do not have a big political weight. Relative to OECD countries their de-508
mographic importance is small. To the extent that the majority of elderly live509
with their children they cannot express their concerns truly independently.510
For these reasons it is important to give the minimum pension scheme a con-511
stitutional status and a frame that makes it adjust to social or economic chang-512
ing parameters. For example the age at which the pension is made available513
could vary with longevity. Benefits should not be absolute but be linked to514
national income growth. One can imagine that with high inflation and depre-515
ciation of the US currency a $2 a day pension quickly loses its attractiveness.516
The exercise conducted in our paper could cover a number of other specifi-517
cations pertaining to the age of entitlement (60 or 65 for men and women), the518
nature of transfers (cash or in kind), the conditionality (schooling of grand-519
children). It is very likely that the results would not change much and that520
priority should be given to the issue of implementation.521
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Table 4. Summary of results: Poverty reduction among the elderly with























Argentina 0.03 0.02 0.796 0.006 0.004
Bolivia 0.17 0.09 0.523 0.006 0.003
Brazil 0.01 0.01 0.526 0 0
Chile 0 0 0.348 0 0
Colombia 0.22 0.11 0.504 0.015 0.011
Costa Rica 0.07 0.05 0.72 0.004 0.003
DR 0.02 0.01 0.514 0.005 0.004
Ecuador 0.13 0.06 0.423 0.003 0.003
El Salvador 0.1 0.07 0.658 0.017 0.013
Guatemala 0.08 0.03 0.365 0.002 0.002
Honduras 0.21 0.11 0.5 0.011 0.008
Mexico 0.15 0.08 0.536 0.003 0.003
Nicaragua 0.12 0.02 0.16 0.003 0.002
Panama 0.06 0.05 0.722 0.005 0.003
Paraguay 0.1 0.07 0.661 0.01 0.008
Peru 0.12 0.08 0.648 0.011 0.008
Uruguay 0 0 0.679 0.003 0.002
Venezuela 0.1 0.05 0.51 0.011 0.008
Note: OECD adjusted HH sizes are used in calculating the poverty headcount ratios.
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Appendix522























Argentina 2006 5,140 344 229 75 0.21
Bolivia 2007 1,220 239 132 66 0.23
Brazil 2006 4,820 337 186 72 0.22
Chile 2006 6,890 464 272 78 0.16
Colombia 2004 2,500 156 85 72 0.24
Costa Rica 2006 5,030 340 216 79 0.18
DR 2006 3,390 278 165 72 0.18
Ecuador 2006 2,920 263 154 75 0.19
El Salvador 2006 2,980 221 152 71 0.17
Guatemala 2006 2,250 208 124 70 0.22
Honduras 2007 1,590 175 96 70 0.28
Mexico 2002 6,000 244 151 74 0.19
Nicaragua 2005 890 151 92 72 0.2
Panama 2006 4,940 303 175 75 0.23
Paraguay 2005 1,240 253 148 71 0.23
Peru 2006 2,930 222 144 73 0.21
Uruguay 2007 6,620 410 276 76 0.17
Venezuela 2006 6,120 239,675 172,852 73 0.18
Note: OECD adjusted HH sizes are used in calculating the poverty headcount ratios.
The poverty line is 0.5 of the national median per capita income.
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Table 6. Household size and structures
Country Mean no. of HH
members
Fraction of HH’s
with at least one
elderly person in HH
HH consisting of
elderly living alone
(as a fraction of
elderly households)
Argentina 3.4 0.32 0.46
Bolivia 4.05 0.24 0.31
Brazil 3.18 0.23 0.32
Chile 3.65 0.39 0.3
Colombia 4.04 0.3 0.17
Costa Rica 3.74 0.25 0.31
DR 3.74 0.27 0.21
Ecuador 4.22 0.33 0.29
El Salvador 4.18 0.31 0.21
Guatemala 5.02 0.25 0.19
Honduras 4.62 0.27 0.15
Mexico 4.2 0.25 0.27
Nicaragua 5.32 0.28 0.1
Panama 3.79 0.3 0.29
Paraguay 4.3 0.29 0.24
Peru 4.5 0.32 0.24
Uruguay 2.91 0.41 0.54
Venezuela 4.3 0.26 0.17
Note: Elderly are HH members aged >= 60 years. Column 1 is the mean number of HH
members in ALL households. Column 2 is #EHH / #AHH. Column 3 is #EHH1 / #EHH.
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Table 7. Poverty headcount ratios with (1) unadjusted household size (2) el-























Argentina 0.21 0.24 0.13 0.11 0.12
Bolivia 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.19 0.26
Brazil 0.22 0.25 0.06 0.06 0.05
Chile 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.15
Colombia 0.24 0.24 0.31 0.29 0.33
Costa Rica 0.18 0.2 0.32 0.25 0.36
DR 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.17 0.22
Ecuador 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.27
El Salvador 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.19
Guatemala 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.26
Honduras 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.26 0.32
Mexico 0.19 0.21 0.28 0.25 0.3
Nicaragua 0.2 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.17
Panama 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.24
Paraguay 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.17 0.26
Peru 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.17 0.25
Uruguay 0.17 0.21 0.08 0.05 0.07
Venezuela 0.18 0.2 0.21 0.18 0.23
Note: Elderly are HH members aged >= 60 years. Column 1 is the mean number of
HH members in ALL households. Column 2 is #EHH / #AHH. Column 3 is #EHH1 /
#EHH.
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Table 8. Household size and structures






Costa Rica 0.07 0.15
DR 0.06 0.07
Ecuador 0.07 0.12










Note: OECD adjusted HH sizes with a poverty line of 0.5
of the national median per capita OECD adjusted income.
Elderly are HH members aged >= 60 years.
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